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Introduction
We examine the effect of managerial incentives and market power on bank risk taking for the U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). In the presence of agency problems, bank managers and shareholders have conflicting risk taking incentives. Generally, bank managers are risk-averse and have incentives to take less risk mainly because their wealth (both tangible and human capital) is concentrated in the banks they manage (Smith and Stulz 1985) . However, bank shareholders have incentives to take 'excessive' risk at the expense of tax-payers funds and creditors because of the well known 'moral hazard' problem from limited liability and mispriced deposit insurance premium (Galai and Masulis 1976; Merton 1977) . This is compounded by the 'too-big-to-fail' effect in large banks. In response to the moral hazard problem, the 'market power' (proxied by charter value 1 )
considered to be instrumental of any bank regulation to restrain bank risk-taking. The disciplining role of the charter value has first been pointed out by Marcus (1984) , who argues that increased competition in the bank industry erodes banks' charter values which in turn increase incentives for excessive risk-taking. However, as discussed later in Section 2, the existing literature on bank risk-taking is inconclusive as to the nature of impact of both managerial incentives and market power on bank risk taking.
As the financial crisis is taking its tolls, the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, Wachovia and the ongoing problems with banks such as Citigroup, Bank of America, signifies the inherent flaws with the existing financial system regulation. In response to the global financial crisis, the G-20 leaders in London meeting agreed to reform financial sector regulatory framework including common principles for remuneration so as to discourage outsized risk taking on banks. Since the inception of the crisis in 2007, much of the public debate surrounds the incentives structure in place which is blamed to have promoted short-termism and excessive imprudent risk-taking by banks at the expense of tax payers' money. In this regard, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) provide evidence that banks with CEOs whose interests were better aligned with their shareholders perform worse.
Similarly, Chen, Steiner and Whyte (2006) find that banks have increasingly employed stockbased compensation following deregulation in 1992 to 2000 periods which encourage more 1 The 'charter value', also known as franchise value, of a bank is the present value of a bank's future economic profits when considered as a going concern (Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan 1997, p.6 ).
risk-taking. Likewise, the financial industry including banks in U.S. has been enjoying least regulation since the passing of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1993 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1997. Apparently, banks pursue to capitalize on this regulatory laxity which may have eroded banks market power by undertaking excessively risky investments. Therefore, this study is timely in that it follows recent financial crisis impacting upon the banking system and relevant in that it expands our knowledge of the interrelations between 'moral hazard' problem, market competition, regulation and bank risk-taking incentives.
Using a sample of 212 large U.S. BHCs over 1997 to 2004 period, we find that the effect of both bank CEOs shareholdings (proxy for managerial incentive) and charter value (proxy for market power) is U-shape. The bank risk initially decreases with CEO shareholding indicating the dominance of 'managerial entrenchment' effect and then increases with CEO shareholding indicating the dominance of shareholders' 'asset-substitution' effect. CEO shareholding at the inflection point (3.62%) for total risk is greater than the mean CEO shareholding of 4.1%. This implies that bank shareholders' asset-substitution effect dominated in the pre-crisis period and hence encouraged bank managers to undertake 'over-sized' risk exposing to the financial crisis. With regard to the market power, the bank risk initially decreases with charter value proving the well-known charter value paradigm dominance and then increases with charter value indicating the dominance of Boyd and De Nicole (2005) risk-shifting paradigm in the loan market.
This study contributes to the existing bank risk taking literature in several important ways. This is the first study to provide evidence of a U-shape relation between bank risk and managerial incentives and between bank risk and market power after controlling for capital regulation, size and other important bank specific variables. This study uses CEO shareholding as a proxy for managerial incentives while prior studies on bank risk-taking use insider shareholding (i.e., board directors and officers shareholding) as a proxy. Kim and Lu (2009, pp. 4-5) describes several reasons for the superiority of CEO shareholding as a better proxy for managerial incentives compare to insider shareholding. For instance, CEOs have more power compare to other executives or directors to capture the incentive contracting process and CEO shareholding is a cleaner proxy than insider shareholding. CEO shareholding also has greater 'within firm variability' to remove the Zhou's (2001) concern related to the power of the test if instead insider shareholding is used as a proxy.
Methodologically, we use multiple proxies of bank risk (e.g. total risk, systematic risk and credit risk) to check the robustness of the results. This is important as various interest groups have their reasons to follow particular type of bank risk. For instance, bank regulators are specifically concern about the insolvency and systematic risks of banks while bank investors are concerned about total and idiosyncratic risks. We have also checked the robustness of our results using various estimation techniques including several approaches to account for endogeneity. For example, we have estimated the econometric model with both fixed effect and system generalized method of moments (GMM) to reduce biases in our coefficients estimates from unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity (if any).
The remainder of the paper is structured into four sections. Section 2 presents a critical review of literature on managerial risk-taking incentives and market power which help in formulating the relevant hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and econometric methods. Section 4 provides the empirical results while section 5 shows the robustness of the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Related literature and hypotheses development

Managerial incentives and bank risk
The separation of ownership from control in corporate firms creates 'agency problem' between shareholders and managers (Berle and Means 1932) . This separation bestows the bank's critical portfolio decisions on managers and the later may not always act in the best interests of shareholders. Thus, it is crucial to understand bank managers' incentives regarding risk-taking. Generally, bank managers are risk-averse and have reasons to prefer less risk (known as 'managerial entrenchment' theory).
Like any investor, bank managers' wealth consists of a portfolio of tangible and financial assets as well as human capital (talent, job related experience). In contrast to other investors, the managers' wealth is mostly concentrated in the firms that managers manage.
To the extent that bank managers have concentrated wealth including their nondiversifiable human capital, managers are expected to protect this internally by selecting 'excessively safe assets' or by diversification (e.g., Smith and Stulz 1985; and May 1995) .
While shareholders can diversify their portfolio risk in the capital market, managers can effectively do so only at the firm level (May 1995 (May , p.1292 . In addition, the expected value of debt tax shield and bankruptcy costs contribute further toward managerial incentives at levered firms like banks to select overly safe projects, rather than excessively risky projects (Parrino, Poteshman and Weisbach 2005) . Furthermore, bank managers could have different risk-taking incentives if managers are compensated through wage and salary contracts rather than through shares and share option programs. When receive fixedwages, managers behave in a risk-averse manner and so are unlikely to exploit the same 'moral hazard' incentives as stock owner-controlled banks. This is because managers have little to gain if their banks do exceptionally well (when their salaries are fixed) but will probably lose their jobs and human capital investments if their bank fails (Saunders and Cornett 2006, p.532) . Thus, bank shareholders want managers to invest in all positive netpresent-value projects, irrespective of their associated risks (Guay 1999). Conversely, the 'risk-averse' bank managers may accept some safe, value-reducing projects, and reject some risky but value-increasing projects (May 1995).
Consistent with the incentives alignment theory, several studies support a statistically significant positive association between board officers and directors shareholding (proxy for managerial incentives) and bank risk-taking (e.g., Saunders, Strock and Travlos 1990; Demsetz et al. 1997; Cebenoyan, Cooperman and Register 1999) .
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) also suggest that the incentives alignment between bank CEOs and shareholders could explain the 'excessive risk-taking' by banks leading to the financial crisis 2007-09. According to Anderson and Fraser (2000) , the nature of the relationship between managerial ownership and bank risk-taking behaviour may depend upon the charter value of banks. They further illustrate that managerial ownership and risk-taking behaviour are positively related only at low charter value during periods of deregulation while they are negatively related at high charter value during periods of re-regulations. On the other hand, a few studies show a negative or non-monotonic relation between managerial shareholdings and bank risk-taking consistent with the managerial 'risk-aversion' theory (e.g., Brewer and Saidenberg 1996; Demsetz et al. 1997) . For instance, Brewer and Saidenberg (1996) offer a convex (i.e., U-shaped) relation between bank risk and insider
shareholding. This demonstrates that bank risk initially decreases (due to the dominance of 'managerial entrenchment' theory) and then increases with managerial shareholdings (due to the dominance of shareholders' 'risk-shifting' effect). However, Gorton and Rosen (1995) find a concave (i.e, inverted U-shaped) relation between bank risk and insider shareholding.
The non-linear relation between bank risk and insider shareholding suggest the trade-off between managerial risk aversion/entrenchment effect and shareholders' assetsubstitutions effect in the incentives contract. Mehran (2008), the governance data is measured on the date of the proxy statement, i.e. at the beginning of the respective fiscal year. The data collection procedure is then adjusted to account for when the proxies disclose some governance information for the previous fiscal year (e.g., the percentage of CEO shareholding) and others for the following fiscal year (e.g., the number of directors). The financial information on BHCs is mostly obtained from 
Measures of bank risk
Multiple proxies of bank risk are selected to show whether managerial incentives and market power have any non-monotonic impact on the bank risk-taking. The three primary market measures of bank risk-taking include total risk (TR), idiosyncratic risk (IDIOR), and systematic risk (SYSR). Following Anderson and Fraser (2000) , TR of a bank is calculated as the standard deviation of its daily stock returns (R it ) for each fiscal year. The daily stock return is calculated as the natural logarithmic of the ratio of equity return series, i.e. R it = ln(P it /P it-1 ) where P it stock price which is also adjusted for any capital adjustment including dividend and stock splits. TR captures the overall variability in bank stock returns and reflects the market's perceptions about the risks inherent in the bank's assets, liabilities, and off-balance-sheet positions. Both regulators and bank managers frequently monitor this total risk.
SYSR and IDIOR are calculated using the following two-index market model as suggested by Chen, Steiner, and Whyte (2006), and Anderson and Fraser (2000) . This model is estimated for each year for each bank:
where, i and t denote bank i and time t respectively; R is the bank's equity return; R m is the return on S&P 500 market index; INTEREST is the yield on the three-month Treasurybill rate 2 ; α is the intercept term; ε is the residuals. β 1i is the SYSR of bank i. while IDIOR is calculated as the standard deviation of residuals of eq. (1) inverse form, i.e. 1/Z, so as to make the interpretation of the signs of coefficients comparable. Otherwise a high Z-score means less insolvency risk whereas a high TR, SYSR, IDIOR, or ARR indicates more risk. Finally, credit risk (IMP/GL) is the impaired loan as a percentage of gross loans where gross loan is the sum of total loans and loan loss reserve.
Measures of explanatory variables
The measurements Bank size (TA): Prior studies showed that bank size could negatively affect bank risktaking (e.g., Saunders et al. 1990; Boyd and Runkle 1993; Demsetz and Strahan 1997) .
Generally, large banks can diversify their assets risk. They also have access to more flexible source of capital and hence can meet any unexpected shortfall of liquidity. Large banks may also exhibit low information risk because they are subjected to frequent investigation by both security analysts and regulators. Finally, investors may have the perception that the regulators will not allow large banks to fail, i.e. 'too-big-to-fail' policy. Following Anderson and Fraser (2000) bank size (TA) is measured as the natural logarithm of end of year bank's total assets, and is expected to be negatively related to bank risk-taking.
Capital regulation (CAPITAL): Following Saunders et al. (1990) 
where subscripts i denotes individual BHC (i = 1, 2, …, 212), t time period (t = 1998, 1999, ….., 2004) and ln is the natural logarithmic. β, and δ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the idiosyncratic error term. The definition of the variables in the regression eq.(2) is as mentioned in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 and also as summarized in Table 1 above. The sign beneath each variable indicates the expected nature of relation between the dependent and relevant explanatory variables. As can be seen later from descriptive statistics of variables in Table 2 , CEOWN and OUTSIDEOWN assume fractional numbers and zeros. Therefore, while taking logarithmic of ownership variables, for ease of interpretation and to avoid any inconsistency/irrational number, we add 1 (one) to both CEOWN and OUTSIDEOWN variables.
Estimation method
Following prior studies (e.g., Saunders et al. 1990; Demsetz et al. 1997; and Anderson and Fraser 2000) , the primary estimation method of regression equations (2) 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
The descriptive statistics for the various ownership and bank-characteristics variables are presented in and statistically significant at 5% or better. Likewise, the correlation coefficient between CV and all measures of bank risk except for SYSR and Z-score are negative and statistically significant. Multicollinearity among the regressors should not be a concern as the maximum value of correlation coefficient is 0.2505 which is between diversification index (DIVER) and bank size (TA). According to Chatterjee, Hadi and Prince (2000), the guidelines for detecting multicollinearity are: (i) the largest VIF is greater than 10, and (ii) the mean VIF is larger than 1.
Empirical results
of less than 3.62%, and vice-versa for CEO ownership greater than 3.62%. It also specifies that the mean CEO shareholding (4.1% in Panel A of Table 2 ) was well above the inflection point (3.62%) in the pre-financial crisis period. Thus, the comparative statistics on CEOWN to some extent suggest that bank management incentives were more aligned with those of bank shareholders and shareholders' risk-shifting effect dominated particularly in pre-crisis period. Hence bank undertook 'excessive risk' leading to the financial crisis.
[ The interpretation of the estimates related to managerial incentives and market power remains the same as those in Table 4 except that the coefficients on LN(1+CEOWN) in odd columns are no longer statistical significant for any of the bank risk measures. However, the coefficients on LN(1+CEOWN) and its quadratic term, [LN(1+CEOWN)] 2 , remain negative and positive respectively and statistically significant for all bank risk measures except for IMP/GL. Similarly, the coefficients on LN(CV) and its squared term, [LN(CV)] 2 , also assume negative and positive sign respectively for all bank risk measures except for SYSR and are statistically significant for all bank risks. Thus, even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the FE estimates also confirm a convex relation between bank risk and managerial incentives and bank risk and bank market power. Bond (1998) 'system GMM' estimation of eq.(2) using different measures of bank risk. In the system GMM, first-differenced variables are used as instruments for the equations in levels and the estimates are robust to unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity (if any). 6 The model fits section of Table 6 show test statistics for both firstorder (Π1) and second-order autocorrelation in second differences (Π2) and Hansen Jstatistics of over-identifying restrictions. The residuals in the first difference should be serially correlated (Π1) by way of construction but the residuals in the second difference should not be serially correlated (Π2). Accordingly, in Compare to pooled-OLS estimates in Table 4 , system GMM estimates in Table 6 above present one notable difference. The positive and negative coefficients on LN(1+CEOWN) and its squared term, [LN(1+CEOWN)] 2 , respectively are no longer statistically significant for any of the bank risk measures. However, the coefficients on
Robustness tests
Fixed-Effect estimation
Two-step system GMM
LN(CV) and [LN(CV)]
2 are still significantly negative and positive respectively for all bank risks. Thus, even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity with two-step the 'system GMM', the estimates in Table 6 still supports that bank market power relates to bank risk in a way consistent with the expectation.
6.Conclusion
This study examines the effect of managerial incentives and market power on bank risk taking. To that end, evidence is sought whether CEO shareholding (a proxy for 6
The 'system GMM' estimates are obtained using the Roodman 'xtabond2' module in Stata. Please see Roodman (2006) for detail estimation procedure of dynamic panel data using 'xtabond2'. managerial incentives) non-linearly associated with bank risk-taking due to the interplay of the managerial entrenchment/risk-aversion effect and shareholders' asset-substitution effect. Similarly, evidence is also sought as to whether the effect of bank charter value (a proxy for market power) on bank risk-taking is convex (i.e. U-shaped) because of the tradeoff between charter value paradigm, margin effect, and shareholder's risk-shifting effect. Perhaps one of the important policy implications of the findings is that bank CEOs incentives were more aligned with shareholders' incentives in the pre-crisis period and so encouraged banks to assume 'excessive risk' at the cost of tax payers fund. This advocates the recent various governments move towards reforming existing executives pay structure including President Obama administration. to avoid repetition of such financial catastrophe and to ensure a stable financial system. Similarly, the result for charter value implies that market power (charter value) is effective in restricting bank risk taking at high level of competition. Thus, bank regulators, and policy makers should appreciate the importance of managerial incentives and market power while designing appropriate incentives structure in banks and evaluating the bank entry and exit requirements in a particular market to avoid 'excessive risk taking. The standard deviation of the daily bank stock returns in each year.
Idiosyncratic risk (IDIOR)
The standard deviation of the error terms in Eq.(1).
Systematic risk (SYSR)
Coefficient of Rmt (i.e. β 1 ) in Eq.(1).
Assets return risk (ARR)
The standard deviation of the daily stock returns times the ratio of market value of equity to market value of total assets times the square-root of 250. 5. Insolvency risk (Z-score) Z = [Average(Returns) + Average(Equity/Total assets)]/Std(Equity/Total assets).
6. Credit risk (IMP/GL) Impaired loan as percentage of gross loans where gross loan is the sum of total loans and loan loss reserve. Panel B: Managerial incentives and market power variables CEO ownership (CEOWN) The percentage of the BHC CEO's shareholdings.
Outside ownership (OUTOWN)
The percentage of total outstanding shares owned by the BHC officers and directors excluding those of the CEO.
Charter value (CV) Keeley's Q (Keeley 1990) which is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of total assets.
Panel C: Control variables
Bank size (TA) Total assets as at the end of each fiscal year.
Bank capital (CAPITAL) The BHC's total equity as a percentage of the total assets. (2006) which is 1 -(squared of fraction of operating income from interest plus squared of fraction of net operating income from non-interest sources such as fees and charges, fiduciary income, trading revenues).
Diversification index (DIVER) The diversification index is calculated following Stiroh and Rumble
Previous M&A (MERGER)
A dummy for any previous period M&A, i.e. a dummy variable which equals one for BHC that made an acquisition in a year, otherwise zero.
Year dummies (YEAR)
Seven individual dummy variables which equals either one or zero for each year from 1998 to 2004 with 1997 being the excluded year. 
ln ( (2008) ARR is the natural logarithmic of the standard deviation of the daily stock return times the ratio of market value of equity to market value of total assets times square-root of 250 in a year. Z-score risk is calculated as [Average(Returns) + Average(Equity/Total assets)]/Std(Equity/Total assets). IMP/GL is the ratio of impaired loan and gross loan. CEOWN is the percentage of shares owned by the CEO. OUTOWN is the percentage of share owned by board directors and officers excluding CEO. CV is the charter value of the bank calculated (following Keeley 1990) as the book value of total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity, all divided by the book value of total assets. CAPITAL is the bank equity as a percentage of total assets. DIVER is the revenue diversification index calculated following Stiroh and Rumble (2006) . MERGER is the dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank has any M&A in the period, otherwise zero. YEAR is a time dummy. α is the constant. β and δ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the idiosyncratic error term. Π1 is the Wald (1943) test F-statistics for the joint significance of the year fixed-effects. Π2 is the White (1980) test for heteroskedasticity which provides the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistics based on alternative procedure explained in Wooldridge (2006, pp. 282-283) . Finally, Π3 is the test for first-order serial correlation which provides an F-statistic based on Wooldridge (2002, pp. 282-283) . The reported t-statistics in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticiy with Huber (1964) or White (1980) Sandwich Estimator for variance. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1)
(8) 
ln ( the daily stock return times the ratio of market value of equity to market value of total assets times square-root of 250 in a year. Z-score risk is calculated as [Average(Returns) + Average(Equity/Total assets)]/Std(Equity/Total assets). IMP/GL is the ratio of impaired loan and gross loan. CEOWN is the percentage of shares owned by the CEO. OUTOWN is the percentage of share owned by board directors and officers excluding CEO. CV is the charter value of the bank calculated (following Keeley 1990) as the book value of total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity, all divided by the book value of total assets. CAPITAL is the bank equity as a percentage of total assets. DIVER is the revenue diversification index calculated following Stiroh and Rumble (2006) . MERGER is the dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank has any M&A in the period, otherwise zero. YEAR is a time dummy. α is the constant. β and δ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the idiosyncratic error term. Π1 is the Hausman (1978) specification test statistics of the appropriateness of the random-effects estimator against fixed effect estimator. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
ln ( the daily stock return times the ratio of market value of equity to market value of total assets times square-root of 250 in a year. Z-score risk is calculated as [Average(Returns) + Average(Equity/Total assets)]/Std(Equity/Total assets). IMP/GL is the ratio of impaired loan and gross loan. CEOWN is the percentage of shares owned by the CEO. OUTOWN is the percentage of share owned by board directors and officers excluding CEO. CV is the charter value of the bank calculated (following Keeley 1990) as the book value of total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity, all divided by the book value of total assets. CAPITAL is the bank equity as a percentage of total assets. DIVER is the revenue diversification index calculated following Stiroh and Rumble (2006) . MERGER is the dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank has any M&A in the period, otherwise zero. YEAR is a time dummy. α is the constant. β and δ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the idiosyncratic error term. Finally, Π1 and Π2 are the test statistics for first-order and second-order serial correlation respectively. Hansen J-statistics is the test of over-identifying restrictions. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics while p-values are in brackets. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
